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Unemployment insurance, as a social policy instrument aims at reducing the temporal 
suffering of the families when the family income provider loses their job. In this context, we 
discuss the results of a research conducted in the first half of 2013 on the unemployment 
insurance policy in Brazil, whose purpose is to obtain an answer as to how the amount of 
unemployment insurance beneficiaries is related and associated with the economically 
active population (PEA) and the gross domestic product (GDP), in order to analyze and 
investigate the sustainability of this policy from the fluctuations of the economically active 
population and the GDP. The methodology uses descriptive and quantitative techniques. 
The results show that the number of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance in Brazil, 
concomitantly, also grows when the GDP and the economically active population grow, 
revealing evidence of lack of sustainability, for a sustainable policy should have an inverse 
association.  
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Unemployment insurance benefit is a social policy instrument used by governments of 
various countries, with more or less restricted access regulations. The purpose of this policy is 
to mitigate the temporal suffering of families when the family income provider loses their job, 
and its coverage and range must be compliant with the economic order and prevailing 
policies. This social policy instrument is potentially required in a period of reduced economic 
performance as discussed by Tatsiramos and Ours (2014), and, the aspect of social justice is 
not discussed, research has shown evidence of possible occurrences of moral hazards in the 
granting of such benefits, as addressed by Wang and Williamson (1996) and more recently by 
Chetty (2008). The need for control and the expected effectiveness of this policy instrument is 
relevant to ensure that the benefits are used efficiently and equitably, as proposed by 
Desbonnet (2005) and Steiger (2005) on its use in France and Switzerland, respectively to 
ensure the welfare criteria, ‘utilitarian and rawlsian’.  
In this context, this paper brings to discussion the results of a research conducted in the first 
half of 2013 on the unemployment insurance policy in Brazil, in quarterly periods, from 2006 
to 2012, comparing and associating inventory data of beneficiaries of unemployment 
insurance ( BSD) to the economically active population (PEA), employment fluctuations 
(FE), unemployed (TRD), and gross domestic product (GDP), from the General Register of 
Employed and Unemployed (CAGED), designed and supplied by human resource accounting, 
produced by economic agents that generate employment in Brazil. CAGED is a permanent 
instrument of control of human resource management, established by Federal Law N. 
4,923/65, which gathers data concerning movement and stock of workers, in which economic 
authorities shall inform the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) on a monthly basis 
and is also used for preparation of studies, surveys, projects and programs targeting the labor 
market at the same time that it supports the decision making process for governmental actions 
relating to employment policy.  
Human Resource Management and Accounting – used by CAGED within non-profit business 
organizations – is an expertise that produces records, controls, and provides management 
information for internal use and for the market, and also to feed government’s database 
required for the managing and conducting sectoral employment policies. 
The unemployment insurance policy in Brazil, established in 1986, has the social function of 
providing financial assistance to unemployed workers who were fired without just cause, 
ensuring them a salary for a period of up to 5 months and assisting in their return to the labor 
market. To obtain the benefit, the unemployed worker must prove having received a salary in 
each of the six months prior to dismissal; having undergone an employment relationship or 
having held a legally recognized independent activity for at least fifteen of the last twenty four 
months. They cannot have other personal income of any kind; nor receive pension benefits of 
continued provision as established by the Regulation of Social Security (RCPS). But these 
criteria have been under discussion in the Congress due to the low performance of the 
Brazilian economy in recent years and may be changed to take in order to take into account 
such poor performance. The resources for funding this policy come from the Worker Support 
Fund (FAT), under the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE), which is the manager of 
compulsory tax contributions to the Social Integration Program (PIS) and to the Program of 
Public Service Asset Formation (Pasep). Companies and other employers contribute to it 
through taxes. 
Considering the theoretical importance of social inclusion of the unemployment insurance 
policy in Brazil, maintaining financial assistance to unemployed workers through government 




unemployment insurance relates to and is associated with the economically active population 
(PEA) and the gross domestic product (GDP). In this context, the purpose of this research is 
to analyze and investigate the sustainability of the unemployment insurance policy in Brazil, 
from the employment fluctuations (FE) and performance of GDP from 2006 to 2012, on a 
quarterly basis, focusing on (a) evolution of the stock of recipients of unemployment 
insurance (BSD), (b) evolution of the stock of the economically active population (PEA), (c) 
the quantitative evolution of unemployed workers (TRD). 
With a premise and expectation of response based on diffuse perception, it would be 
reasonable to expect that the stock of recipients of unemployment insurance (BSD) relates and  
inversely associates with the stock of the economically active population (PEA) and the gross 
domestic product (GDP), retracting / expanding as the PEA and GDP are expanding / 
retracting.  
As the success of an employment policy usually is dependent on actions and positive results 
of economic policies, the underlying motivation that justifies this research is to obtain signs of 
sustainability of the unemployment insurance policy in Brazil, given the turbulence of 
globalized markets affecting the growth of the domestic economy, with significant impact on 
employment fluctuations. The period of 2006-2012 was chosen because it shows proper 
consistency in data reliability. However, official data captured may contain bias of active 
workers in the informal sector who continue in the statistics of unemployed or beneficiaries of 
unemployment insurance, which could only be clarified through an analytical research on the 
accounts of employers who draw up CAGED.  
The results of the research are consistent with its purpose and show that there is a dysfunction 
in unemployment insurance policy in Brazil since the use of the benefit grows even when the 
economically active population (PEA) and the gross domestic product (GDP) also grow. This 
direct association, contrary to what one might expect, as an inverse association, may signal 
that unemployed workers are encouraged to migrate to informality continue to use the benefit. 
This is what Wang and Williamson (1996) and Chetty (2008), in a similar study, termed 
moral hazard, confirming Meyer (1990). To obtain the results, a descriptive and a quantitative 
methodology were applied through gretl and StatPlus statistical packages. In this context, the 
main contribution of the research is to signal to the social policy managers in Brazil that the 
metrics of unemployment insurance policy can be misleading and thus compromise its 
sustainability. 
The following sections present the contributions of theoretical discussion (2); methodology 
(3); result analysis (4); conclusions (5); and references.  
2 THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
Employment-unemployment is a cyclical movement that affects economic policies of 
different countries. For decades the literature shows that countries concerned about the 
distribution of income adopt financial benefits programs to assist unemployed workers in 
order to mitigate social problems and maintain economic prosperity. But in times of 
recession, as argued by Tatsiramos and Ours (2014), unemployment insurance is placed under 
strong scrutiny as the unemployment insurance policy is opposed to economic policies in the 
face of the evidence that the former’s needs for funding increase, and the availability of 
resources for the latter decreases. To produce an adequate review of the state of the art, this 
research aims, in this section, to retrieve theoretical discussions and contributions from other 
researchers, even though they were conducted in previous decades.  
In this context, Wang and Williamson (1996) studied a comprehensive dynamic model of 




this study showed that there is moral hazard associated with the search effort and retention of 
work and that a quantitative comparison of the local unemployment insurance system at the 
time, with a system that was understood as optimal, demonstrated that the optimal system 
reduced stationary unemployment  by 3.4%, while production increased by 3.64%. But then, 
this optimal system includes large amounts of subsidy for an unemployment-employment 
transition and also a heavy penalty for transitional employment-unemployment. Following a 
similar line more recently, Chetty (2008) argues that the benefits of unemployment insurance 
reduce labor supply and its effect has been interpreted as moral hazard caused by substitution 
effect, by distorting relative prices and reducing the marginal incentive for searching a job.  
Also Meyer (1990) tested the level and duration of the effects of the benefit of unemployment 
insurance on the duration of unemployment, using individuals by age group, gender, marital 
status and other attributes. The results of the tests show the individual behavior of 
unemployment insurance beneficiaries weeks prior to the expiration of benefits. Their 
findings also emphasize that, among others, high benefits of unemployment insurance 
produce strong negative effect on the probability of the beneficiary out of unemployment, 
which are corroborated by and corroborate the findings of Wang and Williamson (1996) and 
Chetty (2008) as to evidence moral hazard.  
Looking for a cost-benefit ratio, Classen (1977) studied the effects of unemployment 
insurance in two regions of the United States in the 1960s, relating the value of the benefit 
with unemployment duration, time and cost of job search and leisure. The findings provide 
evidence that the benefits increase causes an increase in the duration of unemployment time.  
But in a subsequent study, Anderson and Meyer (2000) on unemployment insurance in the 
State of Washington in the United States in a period of 13 years until 1985, show that all 
employers pay the same rate of taxes concerning unemployment insurance, and, that after this 
period, employers were allowed to adopt another tax system of average rates based on 
experience. The authors used this fact to explore the effects of the incidence of such taxation 
and observed that the average rates were passed on to workers with incomes lower because 
employers could choose between the previous rate and the average rate. The study results 
indicate that the average rate based on experience reduced worker turnover, applications for 
unemployment insurance and also complaints. 
Through a quantitative model, called general equilibrium model of employment-
unemployment, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) investigated workers’ aversion to the risk of 
unemployment. They showed that an increase in risk aversion reduces wages, unemployment 
and investment, and argue that unemployment insurance has the opposite effect because it 
protected workers seeking high income jobs and high risk of unemployment. They justify that 
in an economy where the neutral risk, there is maximum production without unemployment 
insurance, but in an economy with workers averse to risk, a positive level of unemployment is 
required to obtain the maximum output, and a moderate unemployment insurance program 
encourages taking risks and increases production. Corroborating these findings, Barros et al. 
(2000) argue that unemployment insurance for unemployed workers means tranquility for a 
more careful search, and it enables employed workers to search for a better job. In this sense, 
in periods when the economy enters a process of recovery, unemployment insurance 
destabilizes labor relations, whereas the guarantee of the benefit make workers less averse to 
taking risks and search for a better position in the formal labor market, thus leading to 
increased unemployment and a drop in the duration of labor relations. 
Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) investigated whether unemployment benefits should decline with 
unemployment duration in a model where wages and job search are endogenous variables, as 




in their findings that a shorter time in the authorization to receive unemployment insurance 
leads to an increase in wages, taking into account constant fiscal cost. 
In a similar research, Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) question whether unemployment 
benefit should be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or whether it should be decreased or 
increased according to one's period of unemployment. To answer this question, they examined 
an equilibrium model "search effort" with worker-firm bargaining characteristics, in addition 
to wage with free entry into a new job and the endogenous "search effort" between the 
unemployed. The main result found was that an optimal unemployment insurance program 
entails the decline of the benefit sequence over the unemployment period. The model suggests 
that there could be no common welfare gains associated with changing an optimal benefit 
structure for an optimally differentiated system. 
To understand the effects of unemployment insurance in France, Desbonnet (2005) studied 
the mechanism of choice between efficiency and equality of unemployment insurance, 
analyzing the optimal level of unemployment benefit according to the welfare criteria of 
‘utilitarian and rawlsian’. Their findings showed that the decline of unemployment benefit 
profile is able to mitigate this choice, but requires unemployed agents receive generous 
benefits for a short period of unemployment and that this decline of the profile increases the 
search effort of unemployed workers without diminishing their well-being in many 
disadvantageous positions. 
Switzerland, known in Europe to have a generous system of unemployment benefits was 
studied by Steiger (2005), who investigated the effect of a legislative change occurred in 
2003, to reduce the duration of unemployment benefit from 24 to 18 ½ months for people 
below 55 years. The results indicate that since this change most people left unemployment to 
a state of non-employment or outside the labor force. 
Investigating the effects of duration of benefits of unemployment insurance in eight countries 
in Europe, Tatsiramos (2006) found evidence to suggest that even if there are direct negative 
effects on the increase of the unemployment duration, there are also indirect positive effects 
on the length of subsequent employment. The indirect effect has been observed in countries 
with relatively generous benefits system and to beneficiaries who were unemployed for at 
least six months. The magnitude of the indirect effect showed that recipients remained 
employed, on average, two to four months longer than non beneficiaries and this represents 
10% to 20% relative increase in the average duration of employment, which is offset by 
additional unemployment time.  
Unemployment insurance policy was established in developed countries after World War II. 
In these countries, the historical context was social welfare, in which it full employment was 
sought. Thus, unemployment had a condition resulting from private or circumstantial 
problems. This policy in Brazil has several limitations because it has not been originally 
planned for a society with high levels of unemployment and informality and legislation that 
protects it is not effective to inhibit informal relations between workers and employers during 
the receiving period of the benefit of Employment Insurance (MOURÃO et al., 2013).  
During the period in which the world economy experienced a boom of economic growth, it 
was believed that the improvement of people's living conditions would be a direct and 
proportional result of this growth. During this period, existing unemployment was seen as an 
imperfection resulting from the low economic development of a country, and it could be 
explained by the natural rate of unemployment. Thus, the prevalence of this view seems to 
explain the timid policies of employment and income in Brazil even during the 1960s and 





Serra (2010) points out that as a result of the capitalist crisis of 1970 and the more recent 
crisis in 2008, there was a rearrangement of capital in the area of production and circulation, 
seeking higher profit rates and aiming to fight these crises, which caused the so-called 
productive restructuring. This brought great changes, such as an increase in industrial 
workforce, the exclusion of older workers, the increasingly early integration of children and 
the incorporation of women in the labor market.   
The restructuring process has pushed for the increase in unemployment rates because it 
requires skilled labor and this inhibits the growth of the economically active population 
(PEA), although qualification measures and relocation of workers in the formal labor market 
are being adopted (BRAZIL, IBGE, 2013). 
Various policies, such as wage allowance, unemployment insurance, length of service 
guarantee fund (FGTS) and notice may contribute to the high degree of informality and 
turnover of labor in Brazil. However, one must be unemployed for the perception of these 
benefits. Thus, legislation may be beneficial, but at the same time, it can create favorable 
situations to unemployment, increased turnover and informal employment. In this context, in 
order to combat fraud and incentives for informality, the Ministry of Labor and Employment 
(MTE) has made changes in the Unemployment Insurance Program in 2011, starting to 
require the worker to register in public departments, such as the National System Employment 
(SINE) and attend to a training course, pursuant to law 7,998 / 90. These changes are aimed at 
placing the worker back into the labor market, as unemployment insurance in Brazil has the 
negative impact, on average, of 42% on income and the loss motivates the unemployed 
worker to seek informal occupation. Thus, unemployment insurance does not prevent the 
individual resorting to the informal labor market during the period of receiving benefits as a 
way to supplement their income (MOURÃO et al., 2013).  
To Ulyssea (2008), unemployment insurance represents two sides of government. The first 
side is the policy of repression of informality and the other is governmental oversight, which 
is a formality incentive policy. Thus, improving the analysis of the policy impact level in the 
labor market may contribute to choosing the best government intervention in that market and 
in that respect the author argues that it is essential to address the wage gap between formal 
and informal workers, since this factor is directly associated with the preference of the 
individual for a specific job, and that differences in wages are based on the assumption that 
formal jobs are scarce and have barriers to entry. However, the difference in pay cannot be 
related to formality or informality, but with the level of education where the informal wage 
presents higher than the formal. These findings corroborate Menezes Filho et al. (2004), who 
show that, according to the educational level, the remuneration of the formal sector is lower 
than the remuneration in the informal sector, clarifying that the benefits received by formal 
workers as vacation, guarantee fund, job security and unemployment insurance provide them 
with reasonable compensation. Despite these advantages, the formal sector does not appear to 
offset the additional remuneration of the informal sector. Confirming this view, Fraga & Dias 
(2007) assume that the evolution of the unemployment rate is decreasing with improving the 
unemployed level of education, considering that it takes on average three years to raise the 
educational level of the unemployed, and that education plays an important role in policies 
aimed at the fight against unemployment.  
Informal work seems to still have a strong incentive, which is the high cost of maintenance of 
formal employment that restricts the hiring of workers. But the formality rate tends to rise 
proportionately as unemployment decreases. In this context, one can expect a trend that the 




from a previous informal job, instead of actual unemployment (CORESUEIL and Foguel, 
2009; CORSEUIL et al, 2012.). 
Other positive aspects of the unemployment insurance policy are supported by the services of 
intermediating workforce and professional qualification together with the integration of 
financial benefits that promote a combination of social protection and economic performance. 
These combinations of active and passive employment policies reveal the double purpose of   
providing the unemployed worker with financial support and help to search a new position 
along with training and professional guidance. One of the goals of this policy is related to 
social protection, focusing on aiding workers and providing them with income for them and 
their family, considering that the average amount of unemployment insurance in Brazil has 
increased from R$ 361.40 in 2004 to R$ 599.85 in 2009 following the policy of minimum 
wage increase with expected raise until 2023. This benefit has an upper limit that is calculated 
from the average figure received in the last three months prior to the end of employment 
(BALESTRO et al. 2011; BARROS et al. 2000; AMORIM & GONZALEZ 2009; DIEESE 
2011; MOURÃO et al. 2013)). 
The real increase in unemployment insurance in Brazil may be one of the reasons for Pastore's 
argument (2012), who states that contrary to what occurs in other countries, although there is 
lower unemployment, there is concurrently and curiously an increasing spending on 
unemployment insurance. However, contrary to this argument, unemployment in Brazil has 
not declined since the research data showed that both unemployment and the stock of 
unemployment insurance beneficiaries increased. 
Considering the dynamics of the Brazilian labor market, it can be said that unemployment 
insurance has not been effective in diminishing informality. The time spent in the search for a 
new job in the country is longer than the period one receives the benefit. Moreover, it points 
to a in insufficient unemployment insurance policy, which doesn’t fully and adequately 
mitigate the effects of unemployment over the beneficiary. This means there is a need to 
rethink unemployment insurance policies as a large number of people who receive the benefit 
end up turning to the informal labor market. Informality seems to be the most feasible 
alternative for those who find themselves in a vulnerable situation (AMARAL et al., 2011).  
In essence, existing research point that unemployment insurance policies are destined to 
protect workers in the business cycles of capitalist economies, mitigating the consequence of 
unemployment and constitute a response to the need of a collective action in the construction 
of a skilled workforce, as Castelhano (2005) and Balestro et al., (2011) state, even if the 
current labor market present characteristics of individualism, breaking emotional bonds due to 
the global changes that make workers worried about their safety. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology employed uses descriptive and quantitative approaches applicable to 
research of this nature. The descriptive techniques target the analysis of primary data that 
constitute the sample, grouping according to variables of interest named (a) stock of 
unemployment insurance beneficiaries (BSD), (b) economically active population (PEA), (c) 
employment fluctuations (FE), (d) unemployed workers (TRD), and (e) gross domestic 
product (GDP). The quantitative approaches used statistical and econometric procedures to 
show the relationship and explain causality, if present, between endogenous and exogenous 
variables. The combination of these techniques by means of the following models is sufficient 
to extract from sample data information that answer and explain the results. Linear regression 





3.1 Description of model 
The analytical procedure used for the treatment of variables is supported in the descriptive 
statistics, Pearson correlation coefficient and multivariate linear regression model. The 
exploration of descriptive statistics enables us to analyze the behavior of the data in relation to 
estimators and central parameters. The use of correlation coefficients makes it possible to 
understand the relationship between variables. The use of the regression equation allows us to 
test the significance and robustness of the model. The following equations show how the 
variables of interest that explain the survey results are obtained. 
 
(a) Variation of economically active population (PEA) 
 This equation shows the percentage change of the economically active population in 
each quarter compared to the previous quarter. It is a decentralized model available in the 
positivist literature. 
∆PEA𝑡 =   [(𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡 − 𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡−1). (𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡−1)
−1] ∗ 100                                                (1) 
in which PEAt is the economically active population in the quarter; PEAt-1 is the economically 
active population in the previous quarter. 
(b) Employment fluctuations (FE) 
 This equation shows the quantitative variation of the workforce in each quarter by the 
difference between the amount of worker hired and sacked. However, it does not include 
other variations such as pensions and allowances.  . 
𝐹𝐸𝑡 = 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡 − 𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑡                                                  (2) 
in which FEt is the employment fluctuations in the quarter; TRAt is the total number of jobs 
generated (hiring) in the quarter; TRDt is the total number of unemployed (sacked) in the 
quarter. The function of the TRA variable is solely for obtaining employment fluctuations, not 
being demonstrated in the sample data, but it can be determined by changing the equation.  
(c) variation of gross domestic product (ΔPIB) 
Conceptually, GDP is the total value of the wealth produced by a country in a given period of 
time. In this research timeline is quarterly. It is also a decentralized model available in the 
positivist literature.  
∆𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑡 = [(𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑡 − 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑡−1). (𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑡−1)
−1] ∗ 100                           (3) 
In which 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑡 is the gross domestic product of the quarter; 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑡−1is the gross domestic 
product of the previous quarter. 
 
(d) Linear regression of the stock of unemployment insurance beneficiaries (𝐵𝑆𝐷𝑡) against the 
independent variables in each quarter. Through beta coefficients (β), the equation can signal a 
relation of causality between the variables. 
 





in which PEA=economically active population; TRD=unemployed workers; FE= employment 
fluctuations; PIB=gross domestic product (GDP); ε=term of error; t=quarter; α= constant 
term. 
This theoretical model allows us to approach the stock unemployment insurance, explains or 
not the causal relationship of each variable on the right to the variable on the left side of the 
equation, shows the statistical significance of each variable individually and explains the 
robustness of the set. The TRD variable is obtained directly from CAGED. 
3.2 Sample 
The sample consists of primary data of the economically active population (PEA), 
unemployment insurance beneficiaries (BSD), the unemployed (TRD), employment 
fluctuations (FE), retrieved from the records of the Ministry of Labor and Employment 




, on a monthly period, converted in this research for the 
quarterly period of 2006-2012, supplemented by the gross domestic product variation (ΔPIB), 
calculated by the models of the previous subsection. The data from the repository MTE and 
IBGE are available per worker unit while the IPEA Data refer to thousands of workers. To 
work with a uniform base, the MTE data were converted to thousands of workers, and so are 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Sample of quarterly data on research variables from 2006 to 2012, per thousands of workers  
TRIM PEA BSD TRD FE %PEA PIB TRIM PEA BSD TRD FE %PEA PIB 
2006T1 38727 1518 2902 340 - 130,19 2009T3 41034 1762 3714 633 0.6426 147,89 
2006T2 38894 1443 2738 584 0.4312 130,32 2009T4 41134 1612 3853 62 0.2437 151,89 
2006T3 39044 1414 2859 -619 0.3857 132,23 2010T1 41303 1934 4100 657 0.4109 154,93 
2006T4 39278 1389 3103 -155 0.5993 134,14 2010T2 41325 1817 4160 816 0.0533 156,87 
2007T1 39442 1598 3138 400 0.4175 136,92 2010T3 41465 1853 4315 728 0.3388 158,43 
2007T2 39667 1573 3068 696 0.5705 138,76 2010T4 41590 1855 4492 -64 0.3015 159,97 
2007T3 39741 1526 3157 411 0.1866 140,17 2011T1 41770 2040 4688 526 0.4328 161,25 
2007T4 39911 1497 3361 10 0.4278 143,04 2011T2 41865 2064 4729 740 0.2274 162,05 
2008T1 40085 1722 3565 554 0.4360 145,59 2011T3 41957 1926 4750 540 0.2198 162,05 
2008T2 40289 1699 3578 807 0.5089 147,80 2011T4 42086 1814 4829 -239 0.3075 162,11 
2008T3 40385 1680 3816 725 0.2383 150,12 2012T1 42243 1965 4951 381 0.3730 162,39 
2008T4 40435 1743 4249 -634 0.1238 144,30 2012T2 42447 2026 4838 477 0.4829 162,96 
2009T1 40661 2129 3927 -58 0.5589 142,02 2012T3 42510 1872 4844 394 0.1484 163,73 
2009T2 40772 1961 3698 357 0.2730 144,17 2012T4 42530 1939 4930 -384 0.0470 165,03 
Source: MTE; IPEA Data; IBGE.  
PEA=economically active population; BSD=stock of unemployment insurance beneficiaries; TRD=unemployed 
workers; FE=employment fluctuations; PEA=variation of economically active population; PIB=variation of 
gross domestic product.  
The primary data of Table 1 descriptively already allows for an initial exploration of the 
growth of the economically active population. The PEA shows growth in all quarters, 
including the quarter in which employment fluctuation is negative, i.e., when unemployment 
topped employment, such as 2006T3, 2006T4, 2008T4, 2009T1, 2010T4, 2011T4 and 
2012T4. Throughout the sample period the growth was of the order of 9.82% 
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[(2012T4/2006T1-1)*100], and when the comparison is made with the mean, this growth was 
4.22% [(2012T4/mean-1)*100].    
Comparing the variations of the PEA with the GDP variations, contradictions in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 and third quarter 2009 were observed, when the labor force grows as the GDP 
and employment fluctuations decrease.  
Other contradictions are observed when comparing the data from FE and GDP. In four 
periods in Table 1 (2006T3, 2006T4, 2010T4, 2011T4 and 2012T4) GDP grows and increases 
unemployment, as shown by the negative fluctuations. This situation can be assimilated by 
the greater use of technology, but research has not verified this occurrence. 
Other contradictory situations occur when employment fluctuations are negative and the labor 
force grows. But this may occur in situations such as in the granting of retirement, 
granting/returning from sick leave and compensation for accidents at work. Even though that 
reduces employment fluctuations, it is not characterized as unemployment. 
This preliminary analysis also shows GDP growth at 26.76% and the PEA at 9.82%, BSD at 
27.73% and TRD at 69.88%. This scenario shows significant contradiction because GDP and 
the labor force grow and BSD also grows when it should decrease. This situation could be 
interpreted as an employee replacement by technology or vacancies filled by those in their 
first job, or unemployed workers migrating to the informal market, corroborating the findings 
of Wang and Williamson (1966) and Chetty (2008) when they argue that the effects of 
insurance benefits have been interpreted as moral hazard by reducing the marginal incentive 
for searching for a job. 
On the other hand, when there is the behavior of the stock BSD and TRD flow, taking the 
upper and lower limits, it is observed that the growth of TRD, 69.88% (TRD2012T4/TRD2006T1* 
100) is more than twice the BSD growth (27.73%) in the same period, showing that less than 
half of the workers who lost their jobs benefits from unemployment insurance and, 
consequently, the rest would find a new position in the labor market. But as the FE is positive 
in 75% of the sample period (21 of 28 semesters), it would be signaling that the first job 
contracts would predominate in the increase in employment, confirming SERRA (2010). This 
conjecture really makes sense, considering that the absolute increase in jobs was of the order 
of 3.8 million workers, while the stock of unemployment insurance beneficiaries, on average, 
stood close to 2 million unemployed workers using the benefit. A more accurate analysis 
could signal the difference between the amount of workers who lost their jobs and the stock of 
unemployment insurance beneficiaries effectively repositioned in the labor market or who 
have migrated to informality as argued AMARAL et al. (2011) and MOURÃO et al. (2013), 
but this is not included in the research objectives. 
These preliminary results obtained in the analysis of the behavior of sample data already point 
that the growth in the stock of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance is higher than the 
growth of GDP and more than 2.8 times the growth of the labor force, which can contribute to 
the risk of non-sustainability of this unemployment insurance policy in Brazil, since the 
growth of the fund's resources (FAT) which finances this policy is restricted to the 
performance of employment and production, which grew less in the sample period.  
4 RESULTS 
This section presents the results of analyzes carried out through descriptive statistics, 
correlation matrix and of the econometric tests. The following Table 2 shows the correlation 
coefficients of the variables of the sample, in which the economically active population (PEA) 




the order of 82.73% with the stock of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance (BSD); 
96.97% with unemployed workers (TRD); and 97.45% to the gross domestic product 
(GDP/PIB). The relationship with employment fluctuations (FE), although still direct, is 
weak, amounting to 10.70%. 
 
When the association refers to the stock of recipients of unemployment insurance (BSD), also 
in a horizontal reading, it is observed that the relationship is direct and strong with the amount 
of unemployed workers (TRD) of the order of 82.88%, as well as it is in relation to GDP, 
amounting to 76.72%, but when that relationship is with FE, the coefficient is moderate, 
amounting to 18.79%.  
The quantitative association of unemployed workers (TRD) with the FE test displays a list of 
near-indifference, inverse and weak, in the order of -0.33%, but strong and direct in the order 
of 95.88% in relation to the GDP. Finally, the variable association analysis FE with the others 
expected would be that all relationships were of indifference, considering that FE is only the 
part of employment that exceeds unemployment or unemployment that exceeds the job, but 
the relationship of the order of 10.7% and 18.79% with the PEA and BSD contradicts these 
expectations and shows an apparent imbalance between employment and unemployment. 
As a conclusion of the test, it might be expected that the matrix of correlation coefficients 
would exhibit a linear combination of the variables of the study as it did. But the test shows 
contradictions when the association of the stock of recipients of unemployment insurance 
(BSD) and the stock of unemployed workers (TRD) with gross domestic product (GDP) and 
the economically active population (PEA) is direct and strong. With the economy growing, it 
would be expected that this relationship was of low intensity or even reverse, but the results 
show the opposite, that is, the stock of recipients of unemployment insurance (BSD) grows 
when the two variables (PEA and GDP ) also grow. This behavior confirms and reinforces the 
signal obtained from the analysis show that there is evidence of risk for the sustainability of 
the unemployment insurance policy in Brazil. 
 
Table 2: Matrix of correlation of primary sample data and variables of the research per thousands of workers 
PEA BSD TRD FE PIB(GDP) VARIABLES 
1.0000 0.8273 0.9697 0.1070 0.9745 PEA 
 1.0000 0.8288 0.1879 0.7672 BSD 
  1.0000 -0.0033 0.9588 TRD 
   1.0000 0.1588 FE 
    1.0000 PIB 
PEA=economically active population; BSD=stock of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance; 
TRD=unemployed workers; FE=employment fluctuations; PIB (GDP)=gross domestic product 
Table 3 shows the estimators of the descriptive statistics of the variables associated to the 
workforce and Table 3.1 shows the results of the normality test calculated by the method of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov / Lilliefor. Based on the test results shown in Table 3.1 there is no 
evidence against the normality of the sample data except for the variable buoyancy of 
employment (FE) which features small asymmetry. But these results are already flagged by 




The data distribution around the mean is very cohesive and equal, producing reduced 
dispersion as shown in the small magnitude of the variation coefficients of 0.0287; 0.1206; 
0.1828; and 0.076 standard deviations of the mean PEA variables, BSD, TRD, and GDP, 
respectively. Regarding the variable FE, showing slight asymmetry, dispersion appears more 
significant corresponding to 1.3712 standard deviations from its mean, which reflects the 
employment cycle movement caused by hiring and firing.  
Comparing the averages with the upper extreme (maximum), the results show that the growth 
of the labor force is in the vicinity of 4.2% (42530/40807 * 100); the stock of BSD, 20.76% 
(2129/1763 * 100); the TRD, 25.63% (4951/3941 * 100); EF close to 163.22% (816/310 * 
100); and GDP around 10.25% (165.03 / 149.69 / 100). These results are close to those 
obtained on the sample description of analysis in which the upper and lower limits for each 
variable are the values of the first and last quarter of the series, while the descriptive statistics 
consider the lowest / highest value of each sequence and due to this, reduced percentage 
differences are observed in the results of two analyzes. 
Comparing the minimum limits, minimum of FE in relation to the minimum of the PEA, it 
shows a net unemployment of around -1.64% (-634/38727*100). However, these two 
minimum occur in different quarters (min FE 2008T4, min PEA 2006T1), but both are near 
the quarter in which there was the most negative GDP growth (2008T4). Now comparing the 
upper limits, the maximum FE compared to maximum PEA shows a net employment of the 
order of 1.92% (816/42530 * 100), but these two peaks also occur in different quarters (max 
FE 2010T2, max PEA 2012T4) and also close to the quarter of highest positive GDP growth 
(2012T4), as shown in Table 1 of section 3 above. These results, confirming Pastore (2012), 
show that overall, even if the economy grows, spending on unemployment insurance also 
grows, contrary to what one might expect - that economic growth would reduce the stock of 
beneficiaries unemployment insurance and therefore the total cost of benefits. 
In a stationary context, that is, on average, from 2006 to 2012, the stock of recipients of 
unemployment insurance (BSD) is 4.32% (1,763/40807*100) of the stock of the economically 
active population (PEA), while for workers who lost their jobs, this ratio is 9.66% 
(3,941/40807*100) with the economy growing, also on average, below 1% per quarter, again 
signaling risk sustainability of unemployment insurance unemployment. Comparatively, in 
the United States in the 1990s, steady unemployment was around 3.4% and the economy grew 
around 3.64%, as shown by Wang and Williamson (1996). These two moments (Brazil and 
The United States), although the scenarios are different, show that Brazil's situation is adverse 
due to low economic growth. But this issue of unemployment can be affected not only by low 
economic growth, but also by the demands of the new jobs in relation to training and 
specialization as a result of the use of new technologies. 
In short, the estimators of descriptive statistics show a growth scenario of unemployment and 
increased use of unemployment insurance when the economically active population (PEA) 
and the gross domestic product (GDP) grow, contrary to expectations that this behavior would 
be the reverse. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the model variables related to employment, unemployment, economically active 
population and gross domestic product of 28 quarters in the period 2006-2012 per thousands of workers. 
ESTIMATORS PEA BSD TRD FE ΔPIB/GDP 
Mean 40.807 1.763 3.941 310 149,69 
Median 40.903 1.788 3.890 406 149,01 




Coefficient of variation 0,0287 0,1206 0,1828 1,3712 0,0760 
Minimum 38.727 1.389 2.738 -634 130,19 
Maximum 42.530 2.129 4.951 816 165,03 
Count 28 28 28 28 28 
PEA=economically active population; BSD=stock of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance; 
TRD=unemployed workers; FE=employment fluctuations; ΔPIB=gross domestic product variation. 
Table 3.1 Results of normality test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov/Lilliefor of the model’s variations 
VARIABLES 
Test Results 
Est-Test p-value Interpretation 
PEA 0.07052 0.97565 No evidence against normality 
BSD 0.08292 0.89137 No evidence against normality 
TRD 0.11177 0.49466 No evidence against normality 
FE 0.15023 0.10836 Little evidence against normality 
PIB 0.10272 0.63089 No evidence against normality 
 
Table 4 shows coefficients and statistics produced by the econometric model described in 
subsection 3.1 (equation 4) and shows the statistical significance of the association of 
independent variables (PEA, TRD, FE, ΔPIB) with dependent variable (BSD). The test was 
run with panel data with fixed effects and reveals that, on average, all else constant, for every 
thousand hired workers added to the economically active population (PEA), 224 beneficiaries 
start receiving unemployment insurance (BSD) with 97%; for every thousand workers who 
lose their job, 370 start to be funded by unemployment insurance; and for every thousand net 
employment fluctuations, unemployment insurance receives 182 more beneficiaries with 99% 
confidence. By associating the stock of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance with the 
GDP, the test reveals that for every 1% positive growth in GDP, the stock of beneficiaries of 
unemployment insurance (BSD) is reduced in 28 thousand beneficiaries with 99% confidence. 
Such decrease does not contradict the sign the test shows of correlation between growth in the 
stock of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance and a GDP slower growth, considering that 
28 thousand beneficiaries is close to 1.59% of this stock and, all else constant, it would 
require approximately 62 quarters or 15.7 years for this trend to be reversed. The test was run 
with constant on the basis of panel data with fixed effects. 
Regarding the feasibility and robustness of the test, the magnitude of ?̅?2 = 0.7963 shows a 
strong explanatory power, signaling that the model is well adjusted and the results are 
consistent as corroborated by the highly significant statistics F(5,22) =22.115. As for the 
structure of residues, it is rejected the presence of auto-correlation, considering that the 
statistic test DW (1.6921) is superior to standardized statistic DW (DW-du=1.513) for 28 
observations and 4 explanatory variables and superior to coefficient ?̅?2. In relation to 
structural stability, results show there is no evidence of heteroscedasticity, considering the 
magnitude of the Wald’s statistics (0.0706) being inferior to chi-square statistic.   
Corroborating what was flagged in the sample description in the previous section, all these 
associations show that 37.08% of the workers who lost their jobs have joined the benefit of 
unemployment insurance and, in theory, the other unemployed would have returned to the 
labor market. But it shows a contradiction because the growth of unemployment insurance 
beneficiaries is more than five times the growth of the economically active population (PEA) 




taking into account that employment fluctuations (FE) increase when  the use of 
unemployment insurance benefit (BSD) also increases. Furthermore, one cannot ignore the 
conclusions reached by Corseuil and Foguel (2009) and Amaral et al. (2011) that the 
unemployment insurance policy can stimulate informality. 
Table 4: Result of econometric test of associations of the stock of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance 
(BSD) with the economically active population, unemployed workers, employment fluctuations and the gross 
domestic product in the 28 quarterly periods of 2006-2012 per thousands of workers. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error ratio-t p-value 
Const -4709.36 2936.42 -1.6038 0.12302 
PEA 0.2244 0.0896 2.5030 0.02023 
TRD 0.3708 0.1295 2.8622 0.00906 
PIB -28 8.9622 -3.1346 0.00482 
FE 0.1821 0.0529 3.4376 0.00235 
R-square  0.8340  R-adjusted square  0.7963 
F(5, 22)  22,115  Durbin-Watson  1.6921 
Normality residues: Chi-square 0.9072 p-value 0.6353 
PEA=economically active population; TRD=unemployed workers; FE=employment fluctuations; 
ΔPIB=variation of gross domestic product  
Conclusively the set of test results indicates that, on average, growth in the stock of recipients 
of unemployment insurance (BSD) in Brazil, is (a) directly related to the growth of the 
economically active population (PEA) and the growth in gross domestic product (GDP), 
against the expectation that this growth would reverse, and suggests that a significant 
proportion of vacant job positions could have been occupied by first job workers or workers 
considered not unemployed according to the methodology calculation used by official 
statistics; and (b) directly related and associated with employment fluctuations (FE), when 
you expect opposite behavior, because the increase in employment would reduce 
unemployment and thus reduce the stock of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance. Both of 
these situations, showing contradictions suggest some combination of use of unemployment 
insurance to the informal work because more than half of the unemployed does not enter the 
stock of unemployment insurance and yet this stock grows more than the labor force and 
GDP.  
These signals run counter to what one might expect of the unemployment insurance policy in 
Brazil, i.e., the growth of the economically active population (PEA) as a result of the better 
performance of the economy reducing the use of the unemployment insurance benefit. But 
what is displayed by the test results is the opposite, that is, they grow together – PEA and 
GDP and the use of unemployment insurance. This behavior contradicts Tatsiramos and Ours 
(2014) in that this benefit would be potentially demanded in a period of negative performance 
of the economy (recession), and aligns with Wang and Williamson (1996) and Chetty (2008), 
when they discuss about the possible occurrence of moral hazard. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The research investigated and tested the sustainability of the unemployment insurance policy 
in Brazil, in the quarterly period of 2006-2012, by analyzing the evolution of the stock of 
recipients of unemployment insurance (BSD), stock of the economically active population 




domestic product (GDP). The sample data of the employment policy was generated by human 
resource management accounting, retrieved from the archive of the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment (MTE) and the data of economic growth relative to GDP were retrieved from 
IPEA Data repository. The methods applied were descriptive and quantitative and proved 
sufficient to reveal the characteristics of the sample, as well as the relationship and causality 
between variables, when present.  
Preliminary analyzes of the sample description, descriptive statistics and correlation 
coefficients enabled us to observe contradictions that showed the growth of the stock of 
recipients of unemployment insurance (BSD) higher than the growth of the economically 
active population (PEA) and the GDP. It also revealed that the stock of unemployed workers 
(TRA) grows when so does the positive employment fluctuations, contrary to the expectation 
that economic growth would reduce unemployment and the stock of recipients of 
unemployment insurance (BSD). 
Tests show that, on average, all else constant, for each thousand hires added to the 
economically active population (PEA), 224 beneficiaries enter the unemployment insurance 
(BSD); for every thousand workers who lose their jobs 370 are now funded by unemployment 
insurance; and for every thousand positive net employment fluctuations, unemployment 
insurance receives more 182 beneficiaries, with 99% confidence, highlighting the 
contradiction and signaling the non-sustainability of this unemployment insurance policy. 
Associating the stock of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance to GDP, the test reveals 
that for every 1% positive GDP growth, the stock of recipients of unemployment insurance 
(BSD) reduces by 28,000 beneficiaries, representing a fall around 1.59% of the labor force, 
with 99% confidence. The reduction of the stock of BSD to the level of 1.59% of the PEA, 
per quarter, whereas the average GDP growth was less than 1% per quarter, would require at 
least 62 quarters or 15.7 years for the stock BSD to be administered at a minimum level. 
Conclusively, in relation to the labor force, unemployment, in stationary terms, is in the order 
of 9.66% with GDP growth around 0.85% per quarter. This scenario compared to the US in 
the 1990s, as shown by Wang and Williamson (1996), which was stationary unemployment of 
3.4% and production of 3.64%, can be considered poor and reinforces the sign of non-
sustainability of this policy in the medium term. 
Finally, based on the test results, the direct association of the growth of the stock of recipients 
of unemployment insurance (BSD) with the growth of the economically active population 
(PEA) and gross domestic product (GDP), concurrently in the same period of time reveals that 
the unemployment insurance policy in Brazil cannot replace the unemployed worker in the 
formal labor market and this scenario indicates that this policy is unsustainable because the 
growth in production and employment should reduce the use of unemployment insurance and 
not raise it as the results of the tests show, confirming Pastore (2012) and Amaral et al., 
(2011). These findings confirm the expected causal relationship between the variables, 
although the correlation coefficients were high, but indicate evidence of non-sustainability of 
the unemployment insurance policy in Brazil. In this context the main contribution of the 
research is to signal to the social policy managers in Brazil that the metrics of unemployment 
insurance policy can be misleading and could jeopardize its sustainability.   
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